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1 Introduction
The notion that individuals ought to have equal opportunities in life is popular
among politicians, the general public, and philosophers alike. A sizable number of
empirical studies have been carried out analyzing the extent to which individuals
have equal opportunities for income acquisition (see Ramos and Van de gaer (2016),
Roemer and Trannoy (2015), and Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for excellent recent
reviews). These studies are based on the idea that when evaluating the progress
of societies, looking at the level and distribution of incomes provides an incomplete
picture. A distinction has to be made between income differences arising from factors
individuals ought to be held personally responsible for and income differences arising
from factors outside the realm of personal responsibility.
Given the growing interest in going beyond income to measure individual well-
being, it seems pertinent to apply this discussion to the equality of opportunity
framework. Well-being (or welfare, we use the two interchangeably) is inherently
multidimensional, and growth and income statistics fail to capture this multiplicity.
For this reason, the philosophers who advocate for equality of opportunity do not
advocate for equality of opportunity for income acquisition, but rather something
broader than income such as welfare or advantage (Arneson, 1989; Cohen, 1990).
If individuals ought to have equal opportunities for well-being, then using income
as the acquisition variable in equality of opportunity studies could be problematic.
Incomes ignore the disutility of effort, the well-being individuals receive from other
dimensions of life, and the differences in preferences over income and these other
dimensions.
Once it is acknowledged that incomes are not sufficient for measuring well-being,
the door opens for many alternatives. Which other well-being dimensions are neces-
sary? Should we measure these dimensions separately or somehow aggregate them
to a single number? How can we incorporate the fact that individuals have different
preferences over these various dimensions? Should we try to measure well-being
directly by alluding to self-reported happiness levels?
We use 30 years of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) to
measure welfare in four ways; with incomes, life satisfaction, a multidimensional
index, and equivalent incomes. We use incomes to facilitate comparisons with the
generic way of measuring equality of opportunity. The other three measures have
roots in different philosophical theories about well-being (Parfit, 1984; Griffin, 1986).
Life satisfaction explicitly tries to measure mental states, the multidimensional index
defines and aggregates an objective list of dimensions of importance for well-being,
and equivalent incomes incorporate preference heterogeneity.
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We will investigate if the measurement of welfare matters for 1) characterizing
the opportunity-deprived and 2) tracking inequality of opportunity over time. In
both cases, we first convert our welfare measures into welfare ranks. This minimizes
our reliance on cardinality and assures that the different distributions the welfare
measures follow do not drive the results. Next, we regress the welfare ranks on a set
of effort and circumstance variables, or equivalently, variables we hold individuals
responsible for and variables we do not hold individuals responsible for. Based on
these regressions, we assign each individual a ‘fair’ rank and an ‘unfair’ rank. The
fair ranks order individuals according to how much their effort variables contribute
to their welfare, while the unfair ranks order individuals according to how much their
circumstances contribute to their welfare. The latter ranks can be interpreted as an
ordinal measure of individuals’ opportunities, where the highest ranked possesses
the best combination of circumstances and vice versa. With this procedure, for any
given welfare measure, an individual will have a welfare rank, a fair rank, and an
unfair rank.
In order to answer our first research question, if the measure of welfare matters for
characterizing the opportunity-deprived, we compare the unfairness ranks across the
four well-being measures. Broadly speaking, if individuals have similar unfairness
ranks across the well-being measures, then a characterization of the opportunity-
deprived will not depend on how we measure welfare.
In order to answer our second research question, if the measure of welfare matters
for tracking inequality of opportunity over time, we use the norm-based approach
(see Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) for more information on this approach). In our
set-up, this implies using divergence measures to compare the divergence between the
welfare ranks and either the fair ranks or the unfair ranks. If the welfare ranks and
the fair ranks are highly related, then the individuals exerting the most effort also
have the highest well-being, and there is a low presence of inequality of opportunity.
If the welfare ranks and unfair ranks are highly related, then the individuals with
the best circumstances also have the best outcomes, and there is a high presence
of inequality of opportunity. We introduce a new summary statistic of equality of
opportunity; the correlation between the welfare ranks and the unfairness ranks.
If we consider income to be the outcome variable of interest and consider parental
income as the only circumstance variable, then this summary statistic boils down
to the Spearman’s correlation between parents’ and childrens’ incomes. Hence, it
generalizes a frequently used measure in mobility studies.
We find that the measure of well-being matters little for characterizing who the
opportunity-deprived are. When tracking whether inequality of opportunity has
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changed over the past 30 years, we find that regardless of how welfare is measured,
inequality of opportunity has decreased in the last two decades. These results are
robust to using different divergence measures and, for the most part, to changing
what we hold individuals responsible for. This is encouraging news for policy makers
interested in providing equal opportunities while going beyond income, as they may
broadly get things right if they proxy well-being with income.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly address the Beyond GDP
agenda in a Roemerian equality of opportunity framework. We are certainly not the
first, however, to relate notions of fairness with welfare measurement. Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011) summarizes extensive work on this topic. This prior work generally
incorporates concerns about fairness directly into the well-being measure. Our ap-
proach, in contrast, first computes measures of welfare and then analyzes the extent
to which factors beyond individual control are driving the welfare differences. A
particularly relevant paper for our approach is Ravallion (2015), which incorporates
the disutility of effort into estimates of inequality of opportunity. We go in a differ-
ent direction by analyzing whether the concept of welfare matters for estimates of
inequality of opportunity. In previous studies the measurement of welfare has been
shown to matter for assessments of how welfare has developed over time (Blanch-
flower and Oswald, 2004), for how inequality in welfare has developed over time
(Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008), and for identifying who the most welfare-deprived
are (Decancq and Neumann, 2016).
Roemer (2012) explicitly argues against using welfare as the outcome variable
in equality of opportunity estimations. He does so on the grounds that policy
makers are interested in dimensions of well-being separately, such as health, income
or education, rather than well-being itself. This may certainly be the case, but if
the ultimate objective is to equalize opportunities for well-being, then equalizing
opportunities for only one dimension of well-being might actually bring about the
opposite result (Calsamiglia, 2009). To see this, consider a policy that targets people
living outside of the main cities because they have fewer opportunities to acquire
a high income. If these people simultaneously have better health, more leisure,
or different preferences over the importance of income, they need not have less
opportunities to acquire a high level of well-being. Our framework helps clarify if
such examples have empirical leverage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains both the philo-
sophical and axiomatic theory behind measuring equality of opportunity for well-
being. Section 3 details our data and measurement approach. Section 4 outlines the
results and provides several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
2.1 Well-Being
Three overarching theories of well-being exist in the philosophical literature; ob-
jective list theory, preference satisfaction theory, and mental state theory (Parfit,
1984; Griffin, 1986). Preference satisfaction theory is the most commonly assumed
in economics. It claims that an individual’s welfare depends on the degree to which
his preferences are satisfied. Often preference orderings are assumed to be revealed
through choice behavior. The underlying tenet behind these revealed preferences
is that if an agent chooses bundle A over bundle B, then the agent must prefer A
over B, and the agent must be better off with A rather than B. Mental state theory
takes its starting point in what goes on inside the mind of individuals rather than
their observed choices. According to this theory, well-being is the degree to which
individuals are happy or the extent to which they experience pleasure over pain.
Objective list theory argues that individuals’ lives go well to the degree that they
are in possession of certain items on a list, which could be income, education, health,
safety, etc.
In short, mental state theory care about what individuals feel, (revealed) pref-
erences about what individuals choose, and objective list theory about external
circumstances which could be independent of the choices or feelings of individuals.
Each theory has its advantages and shortcomings. Preference satisfaction theory,
at least in the revealed form, can be criticized when individuals’ decision-making is
subject to imperfect knowledge and behavioral biases. If individuals have mistaken
beliefs about what is best for themselves or lack willpower to choose what is best
for themselves, then there is little reason to believe that their choices are a good
manifestation of their well-being. Mental state theory can be criticized for its ‘phys-
ical condition neglect’ (Sen, 1985), whereby individuals might feel well only because
they have adapted to horrible conditions. In these scenarios, Sen argues, mental
states are not an appropriate yardstick. Objective list theory can be criticized for
being elitist in the sense that a set of indicators and weights are chosen somewhat
independent of the preferences of individuals.1
This three-part division of well-being concepts is still very much in use today
in both theoretical and empirical literature about well-being (see for example the
chapter division in the Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy (Adler and
Fleurbaey, 2016) and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Well-Being (Crisp,
1All of these critiques can of course be counteracted, but doing so would be outside the scope
of this paper.
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2016)). We will operationalize a measure of well-being with roots in each of these
theories and see if they lead to different conclusions about equality of opportunity.
We are not attempting to argue in favor of any one of these welfare concepts. Rather,
we will take some of the operationalizations of these concepts at face value and
investigate if equality of opportunity estimations depend on which measure is used.
2.2 Distributive Justice
Until Rawls published his Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), the predominant view
of justice was defined in utilitarian terms. Under this view, the best outcome is the
one that maximizes total welfare or, equivalently, equalizes marginal utilities. This
view is welfarist in the sense that if all individuals’ welfare levels are known, then
no additional information is needed to decide whether one scenario is more desirable
than another. Rawls argued against this welfarist view, emphasizing that we should
not seek to equalize marginal utilities, but rather primary goods, which is a broader
notion that also encompasses rights and liberties.
A number of subsequent scholars proposed variations of what the right equal-
izandum ought to be, building on the work of Rawls. Sen (1980) argued that neither
utilities nor primary goods were enough to judge outcomes. He concluded that we
need to look at what individuals are capable of achieving with these goods, thus
advocating for basic capability equality. Dworkin (1981) contended that resources
is the right equalizandum, while Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1990) argued that the
right equalizandum is, respectively, equality of opportunity for welfare and equal
access to advantage (see Roemer and Trannoy (2016) for a more complete account
on the developments in distributive justice since Rawls).
Although these philosophers differ in their preferred equalizandum, they all ad-
here to the point of view that knowing all individuals’ welfare levels is not sufficient.
We need to know how that welfare came about, whether it came from fortunate
backgrounds or from factors we can hold individuals accountable for. As such, they
agree on the need to go beyond welfarism and accept some degree of individual
responsibility, and thereby some degree of just inequalities. Notably, none of the
philosophers defined the equalizandum in terms of income. Rather, they considered
broader notions than income such as welfare, advantage, or functionings. Our ap-
proach attempts to get a bit closer to these frameworks. In particular, our approach
is closely related to that of Arneson (1989), who precisely argued for equalization of
opportunities for welfare.2
2That being said, Arneson (1989) considered welfare to be preference satisfaction, thus differing
from our take, where we will look at different theories of welfare.
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2.3 Equality of Opportunity
The philosophical theories of distributive justice have been operationalized in eco-
nomics through the works of Roemer (1993), Van de gaer (1993), and Fleurbaey
(1994) amongst others. The starting point in many of these operationalizations is
to consider a population, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a distribution of an outcome vari-
able for this population, y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn). Often y is considered to be income,
but here we will take welfare/well-being as the outcome, such that yi is the welfare
of individual i ∈ N . An individual’s outcome is assumed to be a product of two
sets of variables: circumstances, aC , and effort, aE. Circumstances are the factors
outside the realm of control for the individual, the factors one ought not to hold
an individual responsible for. These are often taken to be gender, region of birth,
parental education, parental income etc. Effort variables are the factors one ought
to hold an individual responsible for. The well-being of individual i is thus assumed
to be given by yi = f(a
C
i ,a
E
i ).
Inequality of opportunity is frequently measured using either the direct approach
or the indirect approach. The direct approach obtains a counterfactual distribution
of the outcome variable, which only depends on circumstances, and therefore only
incorporates unfair variation. This can be obtained by fixing the effort variables at a
certain level, a˜E. Inequality of opportunity is then measured as the inequality in the
resulting counterfactual distribution, I
(
f(aC , a˜E)
)
. The indirect approach obtains
a counterfactual outcome distribution that only depends on effort, and therefore
only incorporates fair variation. This can be done by fixing the circumstance vari-
ables at a given level, a˜C . Inequality of opportunity is then given as the difference
between overall inequality and the inequality in this counterfactual distribution,
I(y)− I(f(a˜C ,aE)).3
The axiomatic literature on fair allocations has put forward two criteria which
inequality of opportunity estimates ideally ought to reflect, these being the compen-
sation principle and the reward principle. The compensation principle states that
differences in well-being due to differences in circumstances should be eliminated.
The reward principle is concerned with the proper reward of effort for individuals
with the same circumstances. Unfortunately, these two criteria are mutually in-
compatible (Bossert, 1995; Fleurbaey, 1995) unless one assumes that the outcome
is linearly separable in circumstance and effort, such that yi = g(a
C
i ) + h(a
E
i ). We
will follow much of the literature and make that assumption.
We want to minimize our reliance on cardinality assumptions, and hence in-
3See Ramos and Van de gaer (2015) for more methods to obtain counterfactual distributions
using the direct and the indirect approach.
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stead of using the welfare levels as the outcome variable, we convert them into
welfare ranks, ryi = F (yi), where F is the cumulative distribution function. We like-
wise convert our counterfactual distributions into ranks, such that runfairi = G(a
C
i )
and rfairi = H(a
E
i ) where G and H are the cumulative distribution of g(a
C) and
h(aE), respectively. The fair ranks order individuals according to how much their
effort variables contribute to their welfare, while the unfair ranks order individu-
als according to how much their circumstances contribute to their welfare. Within
this set-up, neither the direct approach nor the indirect approach is feasible, as
the inequalities in rank variables are uninteresting and identical. In other words,
I(ry) = I(runfair) = I(runfair). Instead, we will use the norm-based approach.
2.4 Norm-Based Inequality Metrics
The norm-based approach (Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016), also called the fair-
ness gap (Fleurbaey and Schokkaert, 2009), evaluates equality of opportunity by
measuring the divergence between the actual outcomes and ‘fair’ outcomes. The
fair outcomes only depend on effort variables and reflect how much each individ-
ual ideally is entitled to under some allocation principles. The more aligned these
two distributions are, the lower inequality of opportunity. In our context, the fair-
ness gap can be calculated by employing a divergence measure, D(ry‖rfair), which
evaluates the divergence between the two distributions, ry and rfair.
An intuitive measure of the (absence of) divergence between ry and rfair is
simply their correlation. A correlation of 1 suggests complete equality of opportunity
with respect to rewarding effort; individuals with higher effort levels also have higher
levels of welfare. A correlation of 0, in contrast, suggests no equality of opportunity
with respect to the rewarding effort.
Due to our rank conversion, this divergence measure will not satisfy the compen-
sation principle. However, we can construct a parrallel measure which uses runfair
instead of rfair that does reflect this principle. Hence, we will likewise consider the
correlation between ry and runfair. A high correlation between ry and runfair
suggests a high degree of inequality of opportunity with respect to the compensa-
tion principle; individuals with the best circumstances also have the highest welfare
levels. A correlation of 0, in turn, reflects that the compensation principle is com-
pletely fulfilled; the quality of individuals’ circumstances is not correlated with their
welfare.
If we use income as the outcome variable and consider parental income as the
only circumstance variable, then the correlation between ry and runfair boils down
to a frequently used measure of mobility; Spearman’s correlation between parents’
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and children’s income level (see for example Chetty et al. (2014)). We generalize
this measure since we consider more than one circumstance when constructing the
unfairness ranks and apply other outcome variables than income.
Magdalou and Nock (2011) (MN) provide a framework for more axiomatically
grounded divergence measures, which we will use as robustness checks.4 They build
on function φ, for all c ∈ R++:
φ(c) :=

1
s(s−1) c
r , if s 6= 0, 1 ,
c ln c , if s = 1 ,
− ln c , if s = 0 .
(1)
to put forth the general class of divergence measures between an outcome distribu-
tion, y, and a reference distribution, z:
DMN(y‖z) = 1
n
∑
i∈N
[φ(yi)− φ(zi)− (yi − zi)φ′(zi)] , (2)
which satisfies partial symmetry along with other relevant properties. The class
DMN(y‖z) is suitable only for distributions with equal means. This is not a problem
in our set-up since the rank-based measures that we will use in place of y and z by
construction have equal means.5 By using the function φ in (1), one obtains
DMN(y‖z) =

1
n
1
s(s−1)
∑
i∈N
[
ysi + (s− 1)zsi − s yi zs−1i
]
, if s 6= 0, 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N [yi ln (yi/zi)] , if s = 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N [yi/zi − ln (yi/zi)− 1] , if s = 0 .
(4)
Cowell (1985) suggests a different class of divergence measures, which he calls
measures of distributional change, that satisfies different properties. The population
4We are heavily indebted for comments and advice from Brice Magdalou on the use and inter-
pretation of appropriate divergence measures.
5Had not our actual and norm distributions had the same mean we could have normalized our
divergence class further to obtain a (strong) scale invariant class:
DmMN (y‖z) =
1
n
∑
i∈N
[φ(yˆi)− φ(zˆi)− (yˆi − zˆi)φ′(zˆi)] , (3)
where yˆi = yi/µ(y), zˆi = zi/µ(z), and µ(z) =
∑n
i=1 zi/n. It is worth noting that this class boils
down to the generalized entropy class of standard inequality measures if the reference distribution
is assumed to be the mean of the actual distribution.
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invariant measure equivalent to (2) is:6
DC(y‖z) = 1
n
∑
i∈N
[zi φ(yi/zi)] . (5)
By using the function φ in (1), DC(y‖z) can be written as
DC(y‖z) =

1
n
1
s(s−1)
∑
i∈N
[
ysi z
1−s
i − 1
]
, if s 6= 0, 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N yi ln [yi/zi] , if s = 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N zi ln [zi/yi] , if s = 0 .
(6)
The two different classes of divergence measures, DMN(y‖z) and DC(y‖z), co-
incide for one – and unique – parameter value, s = 1. For this reason we are going
to use s = 1 as one of our robustness checks. Parameters s = 0 and s = 2 with
DMN(y‖z) will be used as other robustness checks. Why these two values? One
of the features of DMN is that a progressive transfer in the actual distribution y
reduces the divergence between y and z as long as the individuals involved in the
transfer have the same reference, z. It is a kind of priority given to the worse-off in-
dividuals when the individuals involved in the transfer share the same z. Moreover,
if (and only if) s < 2, the further down the distribution y such transfer takes place,
the more the divergence between z and y is reduced. This property resembles the
principle of diminishing transfers in the context of inequality measurement, which
holds for the class of entropy indices when s < 2. When s = 2 the measure is ordi-
nally equivalent to the Euclidian distance, and it is thus insensitive to the position
on the distribution where the progressive transfer (among individuals with the same
reference) takes place. Thus, the parameter value s = 2 can be seen as a threshold.
Contrary to this, the parameter value s = 0 yields a measure that is more sensitive
to transfers lower down the distribution than our baseline measure with s = 1.
As another robustness check we will also use a divergence measure which is a
generalization of the standard Gini coefficient developed by Alma˚s et al. (2011),
called “the Unfairness Gini”, DGini(y‖z):
DGini(y‖z) = 1
2n(n− 1)µ(y)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
|(yi − zi)− (yj − zj)| (7)
6A scale invariant measure can be obtained by replacing y and z by yˆ and zˆ in (5). Devooght
(2008) provides an empirical application of this measure to equality of opportunity in Belgium.
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3 Data & Measurement
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which is a yearly
panel that started in 1984. The panel contains detailed questions on household
income, life satisfaction, other well-being dimensions, as well as biographical and
historical data that we use to construct circumstance variables. We use data from
1984-2014 and include all working and unemployed individuals but drop individ-
uals outside the labor market and observations with missing values. In total, we
have 176,196 person-year observations meeting our baseline specification. These are
spread around 21,038 individuals in 15,067 different households.
Our baseline analysis will use the following circumstance variables: gender, fa-
ther’s education (3 categories), mother’s education (3 categories), father’s occupa-
tion (6 categories), polynomial of age, height, place of birth (West Germany, East
Germany, abroad), degree of urbanization at place of birth (4 categories), and num-
ber of siblings. As baseline effort variables we use years of education, work hours, a
dummy for whether the respondent is self-employed, and a dummy for whether the
respondent works in the public sector. ‘Effort’ may be a slightly misleading term
here. The point of these four variables is that they plausibly lie within individual
control and hence constitute factors that we may hold individuals accountable for.
Summary statistics of the circumstance and effort variables are given in Table 1.
[Table 1 around here]
3.1 Constructing Welfare Variables
We use four different welfare variables in the analysis. First, we use incomes. This is
the most frequently used outcome variable in equality of opportunity studies. We use
it as a baseline for comparison to the other well-being measures. We use annual net
household income expressed in 2010 constant EUR. The other three welfare variables
are rooted in the three concepts of well-being that Parfit (1984) and Griffin (1986)
put forward.
The second welfare measure we use is life satisfaction, which has roots in mental
state theory. Life satisfaction is the answer to the question, ‘How satisfied are you
with your life, all things considered?’ The answer categories range from 0 (com-
pletely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). For the purpose of this study, we
consider the answers interpersonally comparable. This is not meant as an endorse-
ment of this particular account of well-being but rather as an inquiry into how
inequality of opportunity estimates would look if one accepted these assumptions.
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The third welfare measure we use is a multidimensional welfare measure, which
has roots in objective list theory. To construct the measure of multidimensional wel-
fare we partly follow Decancq and Neumann (2016). We consider four dimensions;
income, health, leisure, and unemployment.7 Income is measured the same way as
above but converted into logs. Unemployment is a binary variable taking the value
of 1 if the respondent had a job at the time of the survey. Leisure is measured as
the amount of daily hours spent on leisure (capped at 6 hours). Health is itself a
composite index composed of 1) an indicator for whether the individual is disabled,
2) the number of doctor appointments the respondent had last year and 3) the num-
ber of inpatient nights in hospitals the respondent had last year. To aggregate these
sub-dimensions into one health dimension we regress a health satisfaction question
on the three variables and use the coefficients as weights. The health satisfaction
variable is composed of answers to how satisfied individuals are with their health
on a scale from 0 (not at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). For the income,
leisure, and health dimension, we standardize the values such that the highest pos-
sible level is 1 and the lowest possible level is 0. Now we have four dimensions each
bounded between 0 and 1. To arrive at the final multidimensional index, we simply
add these four together.
The fourth welfare measure, equivalent incomes, is based on preference satisfac-
tion theory. In short, equivalent incomes are the incomes individuals need together
with a reference bundle, to make them indifferent with their actual bundle. Al-
though preferences are often estimated from choice behavior, this is difficult if the
arguments cover a wide array of dimensions of well-being. An alternative method to
recover preferences used by Decancq et al. (2015), is to regress life satisfaction on the
dimensions of well-being and interpret the weights as marginal rates of substitution.
The resulting utility functions seem to be highly correlated with the utility functions
one would recover from choice behavior (Akay et al., 2015). This approach easily
accommodates preference heterogeneity by simply allowing for interactions between
sociodemographic characteristics, w, and the various dimensions, dim. We follow
this approach and use the following subset of the circumstance and effort variables
as preference heterogeneity parameters, w: birth location, sex, age, age2, education,
work hours, self-employed, public sector worker. As the non-income dimensions,
dim, we consider health, employment, and leisure, like in the multidimensional in-
7Although we would like to include more dimensions, such as education, we run into estimation
problems since this also is considered an effort variable. As we will regress the welfare variable on
circumstance and effort variables, and since we do not want to have the same variables on each
side of the regression, we omit this dimension.
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dex. Our life satisfaction regression looks as follows:
lifesatit = [β
inc + γincwit]ln(incit) + [β
dim + γdimwit]dimit + µt + αi + εit (8)
In order to calculate the equivalent incomes, we first select a reference vector, ˜dim,
of all other dimensions than income. Here we choose the mean outcome (mode
for categorical variables), since this avoids favoring any extreme marginal rates of
substitution. Then we calculate the income needed together with ˜dim for this joint
bundle to make individuals indifferent with their actual bundle. That is, we isolate
inceqit below:
lifesat(incit, dimit) = lifesat(inc
eq
it ,
˜dim)
⇔ inceqit = exp
(
ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimwit
βinc + γincwit
(dimit − ˜dim)
) (9)
The final result is an interpersonally comparable measure of individual welfare that
takes differences in preferences into account.
By employing equivalent incomes as a welfare measure in our analysis, we are im-
plicitly taking sides in a rich philosophical debate about whether individuals should
be held responsible for their preferences. Our baseline approach deems differences
in well-being arising from preference heterogeneity unfair if they stem from circum-
stance variables, but fair if they stem from effort variables. This is in contrast to
most applications of equivalent incomes, which hold that individuals should be re-
sponsible for all their preferences. We can amend our approach such that individuals
are held responsible for all their preferences by decomposing the equivalent income
measure into a part that is due to preference heterogeneity and a part that does not
incorporate preferences. We will do so as a robustness check. A detailed discussion
of this method along with an illustration is given in Appendix A.1.
Histograms of the four final welfare measures (with the incomes and equivalent
incomes expressed in logs) are presented in Figure 1. We turn these welfare measures
into welfare ranks, ry, and break ties by adding a small amount of random noise to
the well-being levels.
[Figure 1 around here]
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3.2 Estimating Equality of Opportunity
For our empirical specification, we consider the well-being ranks to be linear in effort
and circumstance variables:
ryit = β
CaCit + β
EaEit + it (10)
Two important issues remain unsettled. First is the issue of how to interpret the
error term, it. The error contains omitted effort variables, omitted circumstance
variables, measurement error, and general uncertainty. It is unclear whether this
should be considered within individual control. This is an important decision as it
accounts for most of the variation in the welfare ranks. In our baseline specification,
we consider it an effort variable, but as a robustness check we shift it to the other
side of the responsibility cut.
The other unsettled issue is what to do with the correlation between the effort
and circumstance variables. Individuals’ effort levels are partly determined by their
own choices and partly by their circumstances. Years of education, for example, is
partly influenced by individuals’ social background and partly by an individual’s own
choices. We follow Roemer’s approach and consider this correlation to be outside
the realm of individual responsibility (Roemer, 1998).8 In practice this means that
prior to estimating the impact of circumstances and efforts on well-being we perform
an auxiliary regression of the following form:
aEit = γa
C
it + ηit (11)
We perform such a regression for each effort variable and use the residuals from
these regressions as our effort variables in our main regression, which then becomes:
ryit = (β
C + γβE)aCit + β
Eηit + it (12)
Due to the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell theorem, the coefficients on the effort variables
will be the same in (10) and (12). The coefficients on the circumstance variables
will be different as they in (12) also incorporate the indirect effect of circumstances
on effort. We will later report specifications where we omit this auxiliary regression.
To compare who the opportunity-deprived are across the four well-being mea-
sures, we rank individuals according to their opportunity profile, that is, according
to the quality of their circumstances. We calculate each person’s yearly unfairness
8Jusot et al. (2013) likewise call this Roemer’s view, while not correcting for this correlation is
termed Barry’s view (Barry, 2005). A final possibility, where the correlation between effort and
circumstances is considered effort, is called Swift’s view (Swift, 2005).
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rank as
runfairit = Gt
[
(βC + γβE)aCit
]
, (13)
where Gt is the yearly cumulative distribution of individuals’ unfair advantage. This
allows us to compare the opportunity-deprived across the four well-being measures.
To estimate equality of opportunity over time using the norm-based approach,
we also compute ‘fair’ well-being ranks. These are given by
rfairit = Ht
[
βEηit + it
]
, (14)
where Ht is yearly the cumulative distribution of individuals’ fair advantage. Us-
ing a divergence measure, we are now able to compute the level of inequality of
opportunity for each of the welfare variables for each year of the survey.
4 Results
4.1 Who are the Opportunity-Deprived?
Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 shows the results of the regressions from equation (12).
Based on this output and equation (13), we calculate each person’s unfairness rank.
Table 2 shows the correlations between these unfairness ranks for the four wel-
fare measures. The correlations reveal the extent to which the same people are
opportunity-deprived across the four measures. In the table - and throughout the
paper - we bootstrap confidence intervals in order to take all derived uncertainty
into account, including the uncertainty when constructing the welfare measures. We
bootstrap 500 resamples at individual-level clusters.
[Table 2 around here]
The unfairness ranks display rather high correlations, suggesting that the same
people are opportunity-deprived regardless of how we measure welfare. The welfare
measures we have constructed are of course partly contained within each other; the
income variable is included in both the multidimensional index and the equivalent
income measure, and the latter two use the same four dimensions but aggregate them
differently. We can analyze the extent to which this is driving the high unfairness
correlations by comparing the unfairness correlations with the correlation between
the welfare ranks, ry, which are shown in Table 3. In all cases, the correlations are
higher when we look at runfair. This indicates that the high unfairness correlations
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are not driven just by the measures’ interrelatedness. This also suggests that the
way welfare is measured matters more if we target the welfare-deprived than if we
target the opportunity-deprived.
[Table 3 around here]
Since individuals’ opportunities are unobservable, policy makers may have to
assist the opportunity-deprived indirectly. One way of doing so is by targeting
individuals with circumstance profiles that are highly correlated with having low
opportunities. We can use the unfairness ranks to test if the characteristics of
the most opportunity-deprived are similar across the four welfare measures. To do
so, we calculate the average unfairness rank for individuals with a given circum-
stance. Results are shown in Figure 2. The lower the average unfairness rank, the
less opportunities individuals with the given circumstance have, and the more this
circumstance is a potential factor policy makers can use to target the opportunity-
deprived. If the average rank is less than 50, the particular group has less than
average opportunities.
[Figure 2 around here]
There are many similarities across the welfare measures. Individuals with low
educated parents and individuals whose father was a blue-collar worker or not em-
ployed have low opportunities. The same applies to individuals who grew up in
the countryside, individuals born in East Germany, short individuals, females, and
individuals with many siblings.
Important differences emerge only in two places, for people born abroad and
for different age groups. People born abroad are more opportunity-deprived in all
measures but life satisfaction. A possible explanation for this is that people born
abroad perceive the life satisfaction scale differently than Germans, in which case
this difference has little to do with differences in opportunity sets. Indeed, the
regression output in Table A.1 in Appendix A.2 reveal that the only time where
being born abroad, ceteris paribus, is not associated with lower welfare is for life
satisfaction. If we exclude this circumstance variable from the regression, calculate
new unfairness ranks, and again compute the average unfairness rank of individuals
born abroad, then it falls below 50. Hence, we cannot exclude that this effect solely
is due to scaling effects.
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With respect to age, young people are opportunity-deprived in income but not in
the multidimensional index. This is hardly surprising as the multidimensional index
includes health, and young people on average are more healthy. It is questionable
whether resources should be allocated such that individuals have equal opportunities
in every part of their life. For this reason, we will later on place age on the other
side of the responsibility cut. This may seem counterintuitive but it amounts to
saying that individuals should have equal opportunities on expectation over their
lifecycle rather than in every point of their life (see Alm˚as et al. (2011) for a similar
approach).
In sum, there seems to be relatively large agreement about whom the opportunity-
deprived are across the four measures. Hence, if a policy maker strives to target
the individuals with low opportunities, it matters relatively little how welfare is
measured.
4.2 Equality of Opportunity over Time
To compare the development in equality of opportunity over time across the four
welfare measures, we calculate the yearly correlations between ryt and, respectively,
runfairt and r
fair
t . Results are displayed in Figure 3
[Figure 3 around here]
Before commenting on the trends over time, one remark is necessary. The level
of the correlations cannot be compared across the different welfare measures. The
reason for this is that some of the welfare ranks, particularly the life satisfaction
ranks, by construction are noisier. This means that the residuals of the regression
take up most of the variation. In our baseline set-up the residual is considered an
effort variable that gets incorporated into the fairness ranks. The fairness ranks will
therefore be very highly correlated with the actual ranks for a measure such as life
satisfaction (and vice versa for the unfairness ranks). It cannot be concluded that
there is more equality of opportunity with life satisfaction than, say, income, as the
difference in levels may be entirely due to the degree of random noise inherent in
the measures. This explains why the correlations in panel (b) of Figure 3 are much
greater than in panel (a). To circumvent this problem, we will compare the trends
over time.
With regards to the trends over time, all measures undergo a sharp increase in
inequality of opportunity in the early ‘90s. This is caused by the introduction of East
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Germany into the sample. In panel (a), there is a gradual improvement in inequality
of opportunity over the past 15 years. In other words, the quality of individuals’
circumstances is becoming less correlated with their welfare levels - regardless of how
welfare is measured. At the same time panel (b) shows that for both the income
and the equivalent income measure, the effort ranks are becoming more associated
with the welfare ranks, suggesting that effort is being more rewarded. Only for
life satisfaction and the multidimensional index do we not see improvements in this
aspect over the past 15 years.
The figures suggest that regardless of what concept of welfare we use to measure
inequality of opportunity, the trends over broadly similar; inequality of opportunity
increased with the introduction of East Germany, and overall inequality of oppor-
tunity - understood as some combination of the trends of panel (a) and panel (b) -
has improved over the past 15 years.
4.3 Altering the Responsibility Cut
The analysis thus far was based on important normative assumptions regarding what
individuals were held responsible for. We assumed that individuals were responsible
for four variables (4var); their education, work hours, and whether they are self-
employed or work in the public sector. We also assumed that individuals should
not be held responsible for the part of these variables that could be accounted for
by circumstance variables. That is, the correlation (cor) between circumstance and
efforts was itself considered outside the control of individuals. We further assumed
that the part of individual well-being that was unaccounted for by circumstance
or effort variables (residual) was within individual control. Next, we implicitly
considered well-being differences across different age groups (age) as unfair. Finally,
for the equivalent income measure, we assumed that individuals were not responsible
for well-being differences due to preference heterogeneity arising from circumstances
(pref ).
Our baseline effort set contained 4var and residual. In this section, we try to
shift the responsibility cut by alterting what goes into the effort set. First, we look
at whether the characteristics of the opportunity-deprived change, as we change the
effort set. This is analyzed in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 uses our most narrow effort
set, only 4var, while Figure 5 uses the widest possible effort set, 4var, residual, cor,
age, pref.
[Figures 4 and 5 around here]
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The figures show the same overall pattern as our main results; for the most part
the opportunity-deprived share the same characteristics across all four measures.
The only disputes are, once again, for individuals born abroad, and for different age
groups. The responsibility cut does matter, however, for quantifying the degree to
which a particular group is opportunity-deprived. For example, individuals born
in East Germany have an average opportunity rank of about 35 with the smallest
effort set and 15 with the largest effort set.
Next, we look at whether the developments over time depend on where we place
the responsibility cut. We try six different specifications, which gradually expand
the effort set. Results are displayed in Figure 6. Keep in mind that our primary
interest is not whether the trends change as we change the responsibility cut, but
rather whether the four well-being measures follow similar trends regardless of where
we place the cut.
[Figure 6 around here]
Our baseline results are displayed in panel (c). If we add more to the respon-
sibility side (panel (d) to (f)), then the pattern remains the same; inequality of
opportunity increased with the inclusion of East Germany but since then gradually
fell. This applies to all four welfare variables. Hence, broadening our effort set does
not influence our baseline results. The picture looks similar but less pronounced if
we only consider the residual in the effort set (panel (b)). There are slightly diverg-
ing patterns in the ‘90s, but over the last fifteen years all four well-being display
improvements in equality of opportunity. If we only hold individuals responsible for
the four choice variables and not the residual (panel (a)), then the picture looks very
different, particularly for life satisfaction. As already argued, the life satisfaction
ranks carry a lot of noise, implying that the four choice variables are only able to ex-
plain a very little part of the variance. When we rank individuals according to their
unfairness and let the residual be part of the unfairness ranks, these will be almost
perfectly aligned with the welfare ranks. Other studies that have tried to switch the
residual to the other side of the responsibility cut likewise found this to have a great
impact on the results (see for example Alma˚s et al. (2011)and Devooght (2008)).
Still, the trends over time are broadly the same across the other three well-being
measures.
In Figure A.2 in Appendix A.3, we show the impact of changing the responsibility
cut for the correlations between ry and rfair. As long as we do not change the
residual to the other side, the figures display a modest decrease in inequality of
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opportunity for incomes and equivalent incomes since 2000 and a flat trend for
life satisfaction and the multidimensional index. The picture looks different, but
the trends are somewhat similar, if we switch the residual to the other side of the
responsibility cut. This is little different from our baseline results.
In sum, we find that when characterizing whom the opportunity-deprived are,
neither the measure of welfare nor the precise location of the responsibility cut is
of great importance. When analyzing developments in equality of opportunity over
time, where we place the residual matters quite a bit, while enlarging the effort
set further has few implications. For all well-being variables, we find that over the
past fifteen years, the correlation between welfare ranks and unfairness ranks have
decreased, while the correlation between welfare ranks and fairness ranks in no case
has become worse.
4.4 Robustness Checks
The main analysis was based on a specific choice of a divergence measure. In this
section, we test whether our findings are sensitive to using other divergence measures.
We use the Magdalou-Nock divergence measures with s = 0, s = 1, and s = 2,
as well as the fairness Gini. We display the results both when calculating the
divergence between ry and rfair (Figure A.3 in Appendix A.3) and when calculating
the divergence between ry and runfair (Figure A.4 in Appendix A.3). Recall that for
these measures a large divergence between ry and runfair suggests greater equality
of opportunity. The reverse applies to the divergence between ry and rfair.
The results are qualitatively unchanged when we use the Magdalou-Nock diver-
gence measures with s = 1, s = 2, or the fairness Gini. In all three cases, the
unfairness ranks and the welfare ranks are growing more apart in the past fifteen
years. In contrast, the fairness ranks and the welfare ranks are growing more alike
for equivalent incomes and incomes while no trend is visible for life satisfaction and
the multidimensional index. This mimics exactly our baseline results, suggesting
that they are not driven by our particular choice of divergence measure. Only the
Magdalou-Nock divergence measure with s = 0 displays different developments. In
particular, the developments are quite erratic with large confidence bans making it
hard to extract any meaningful changes. This divergence measure puts great em-
phasis on divergences at the bottom of the distribution and is particularly sensitive
to values close to zero. If we add 1 to all ranks (such that the ranks go from 1 to
101), then the Magdalou-Nock index with s = 0 shows the same trends as the other
divergence measures.
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5 Conclusion
We have investigated if equality of opportunity estimates depend on what, precisely,
it is that we seek to equalize opportunities for. Based on philosophical literature
on well-being, we constructed four measures of welfare that are candidates for what
we ought to equalize opportunities for. Upon constructing these, we analyzed if the
way welfare is measured matters for 1) characterizing the opportunity-deprived and
2) tracking inequality of opportunity over time. We found that for the most part,
neither depend greatly on what measure of well-being we use. These results are
robust to most alternative measurement assumptions and changes to the responsi-
bility cut. This is encouraging news for researchers and policy makers interested in
going beyond GDP. Whereas previous research has shown that going beyond GDP
matters greatly for defining the welfare-deprived and for tracking growth in welfare
over time, our findings suggest that going beyond income is less important if the ob-
ject of interest is equality of opportunity. Circumstances beyond individual control
influence welfare in a similar fashion regardless of how welfare is measured. Hence,
for matters of distributive justice, alternative measures of GDP seem to have less
importance, and a good picture may be achieved by simply using incomes as a proxy
variable for welfare.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Circumstance Variables
Father’s Education: Primary school 0.68 0.47 0 1
Father’s Education: Secondary school 0.19 0.40 0 1
Father’s Education: Tertiary school 0.13 0.33 0 1
Mother’s Education: Primary school 0.71 0.45 0 1
Mother’s Education: Secondary school 0.22 0.42 0 1
Mother’s Education: Tertiary school 0.07 0.25 0 1
Father’s Occupation: Blue-collar (untrained) 0.14 0.35 0 1
Father’s Occupation: Blue-collar (trained) 0.34 0.47 0 1
Father’s Occupation: Not employed 0.06 0.24 0 1
Father’s Occupation: White-collar 0.26 0.44 0 1
Father’s Occupation: Self-employed 0.12 0.32 0 1
Father’s Occupation: Civil servant 0.08 0.28 0 1
Place of Upbringing: Large city 0.22 0.41 0 1
Place of Upbringing: Medium city 0.18 0.38 0 1
Place of Upbringing: Small city 0.23 0.42 0 1
Place of Upbringing: Countryside 0.37 0.48 0 1
Place of Birth: West Germany 0.66 0.47 0 1
Place of Birth: East Germany 0.27 0.44 0 1
Place of Birth: Abroad 0.07 0.26 0 1
Height (cm) 173 9.13 80 210
Female 0.47 0.50 0 1
Number of siblings 1.94 1.68 0 17
Age 42.0 12.1 17 91
Effort Variables
Years of education 12.6 2.72 7 18
Weekly working time 35.9 15.9 0 80
Self-employed 0.09 0.29 0 1
Works in public sector 0.18 0.39 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics of circumstance and effort variables. n = 176, 196.
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Table 2: Correlation Between Unfairness Ranks
Income Life Sat. Multidim. Index Equivalent Inc.
Income - - - -
Life Satisfaction 0.60 - - -
(0.55, 0.66)
Multidim. Index 0.64 0.90 - -
(0.61, 0.68) (0.87, 0.93)
Equivalent Inc. 0.88 0.72 0.82 -
(0.79, 0.92) (0.66, 0.79) (0.76, 0.88)
Notes: Correlations between runfair for the four welfare measures. Bootstrapped 95th percentile
confidence intervals in parenthesis.
Table 3: Correlation Between Welfare Ranks
Income Life Sat. Multidim. Index Equivalent Inc.
Income - - - -
Life Satisfaction 0.21 - - -
(0.20, 0.22)
Multidim. Index 0.41 0.23 - -
(0.40, 0.43) (0.22, 0.24)
Equivalent Inc. 0.66 0.27 0.77 -
(0.61, 0.71) (0.26, 0.28) (0.74, 0.80)
Notes: Correlation between welfare ranks, ry. Bootstrapped 95th percentile confidence intervals
in parenthesis.
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Figures
Figure 1: Histograms
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Notes: Histograms of the four welfare measures.
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Figure 2: Who are the Opportunity-deprived?
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Notes: The figure shows the average unfairness rank for individuals that share
a given circumstance. If the points are to the left of the line at 50, then
individuals with this circumstance are more than average opportunity-deprived
and vice versa. Bars indicate bootstrapped 95th percentile confidence bans.
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Figure 3: Equality of Opportunity over Time
(a) Correlation between ry & runfair
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1984-2014. In
panel (a) large correlations suggest a high presence of inequality of opportunity, while in panel (b)
high correlations suggest a low presence of inequality of opportunity. Bars indicate bootstrapped
95th percentile confidence bans.
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Figure 4: Changing the Responsibility Cut: Effort = {4var}
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Notes: The figure shows the average unfairness rank for people sharing
a particular circumstance using a narrow effort set. Bars indicate boot-
strapped 95th percentile confidence bans.
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Figure 5: Changing the Responsibility Cut: Effort = {4var, residual, cor, age, pref}
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Notes: The figure shows the average unfairness rank for people sharing
a particular circumstance using a wide effort set. We no longer report
differences in the average unfairness rank by age groups, as the objective
now is to equalize lifetime opportunities. Bars indicate bootstrapped 95th
percentile confidence bans.
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Figure 6: Altering the Responsibility Cut
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(b) Effort: Residual
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(c) Effort: 4var, residual
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(e) Effort: 4var, residual, cor, age
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(f) Effort: 4var, residual, cor, age, pref
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1984-2014 for
different responsibility cuts. 4var: The four variables work hours, education, self-employed, and
works in public sector are considered effort. Residual: The residuals from the regressions of
the well-being variables on circumstance and effort variables are considered effort. Age: Age is
considered effort (implying we are equalizing lifetime opportunities). Cor: The correlation between
effort and circumstance variables is not considered a circumstance. Pref: Individuals are fully held
responsible for their preferences (only applies to the equivalent income measure). Our baseline
specification used 4var and residual as effort.
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A Appendix
A.1 Decomposition of Equivalent Incomes
The equivalent incomes are calculated from the following equation:
inceqit = exp
(
ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimwit
βinc + γincwit
(dimit − ˜dim)
)
(15)
We want to decompose this into a part that reflects the welfare individuals derive
from their specific preferences, and a part that reflects the welfare individuals re-
ceive independent of their particular preferences. To do so we define a set of norm
preferences by fixing the preference heterogeneity variables at a given level, w˜, and
computing individuals’ equivalent incomes with these norm preferences:
˜inc
eq
it = exp
(
ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimw˜
βinc + γincw˜
(dimit − ˜dim)
)
(16)
We choose the mean (mode for categorical variables) of the preference heterogeneity
variables as the norm preferences. ˜inc
eq
it does not depend on an individual’s prefer-
ences, and has thus taken the preference heterogeneity out of the original equivalent
incomes. We can now express an individual’s equivalent income as:
inceqit = ˜inc
eq
it + φit, (17)
where φit is the contribution to equivalent incomes individuals receive from the
match between their particular bundle and their preferences. An illustrative exam-
ple is given in Figure A.1. We consider three individuals, A, B, and C, and two
dimensions of well-being, income and health. A, B, and C all consume the same
bundle, which contains a lot of income but only little health. They have different
preferences, though, with A putting the largest preference on income relative to
health compared to B and C. It seems fitting that A should derive the most welfare
from this income-heavy bundle, which also is the case when we calculate the three
individuals’ equivalent incomes.
Suppose that A, B, and C have different preferences because of variation in a
circumstance variable, for example their parents’ level of education. If we use the
equivalent income ranks as the welfare variable that is regressed on effort and circum-
stance variables, which include parental education, then the coefficient on parents’
education will eat up the differences in equivalent incomes. When we construct
the unfairness ranks, A will have a higher unfairness rank than B and C, because
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Figure A.1: Equivalent Income Illustration
inceqB
inceqC
inceqA
xA = xB = xC
uB
uC
uA
h˜ Health (h)
Income (inc)
A’s circumstances - through his preferences - are yielding a higher well-being rank.
This means that well-being differences due to preference heterogeneity from circum-
stances are not considered fair, and individuals are not held fully responsible for
their preferences.
Our decomposition can circumvent this problem. In this example, we choose
individual B’s preferences as the norm preferences. Our decomposition asks what
level of equivalent incomes each individual would have had with B’s preferences.
In this case, all three individuals would have ˜inc
eq
i = inc
eq
B for i = A,B,C. This
means that φA = inc
eq
A − inceqB > 0 and φC = inceqC − inceqB < 0, implying that A gets
a positive boost from the match between his bundle of goods and his preferences,
while the reverse applies to C.
In essence, we want to hold individuals responsible for their φ-term. Suppose we
use ranks of ˜inc
eq
it instead of inc
eq
it to regress on circumstance and effort variables.
Since the φ-terms are not part of these ranks, the circumstance variables can no
longer pick up well-being differences due to preference heterogeneity. Hence, when
we calculate the unfair ranks, preference heterogeneity does not enter, and individ-
uals are held responsible for their preferences. We still use the baseline equivalent
incomes, inceqit , to calculate the welfare ranks we use for the divergence measures,
but the unfairness ranks will be based on a regression with ˜inc
eq
.
Unfortunately, this method does not allow us to calculate fairness ranks that
hold individuals responsible for their preferences. If we follow the same approach as
above, and hence regress the ranks of ˜inc
eq
it on circumstance and effort variables, we
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face the problem that the fairness ranks should be composed of both the contribution
from the effort variables and the φit-terms. As these two terms are on different scales,
it is not entirely clear how to add them and turn them into a ranked-based measure.
Hence, we will only use the decomposition of equivalent incomes for divergences
between ry and runfair.
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A.2 Regression Output
Table A.1: Regressing Welfare Ranks on Circumstances and Effort
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A.3 Robustness Checks
Figure A.2: Altering the Responsibility Cut, D(ry‖rfair)
(a) Effort: 4var
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(b) Effort: Residual
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(c) Effort: 4var, residual
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(d) Effort: 4var, residual, cor
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(e) Effort: 4var, residual, cor, age
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity from 1984-2014 for different responsibility cuts.
4var: The four variables work hours, education, self-employed, and works in public sector are
considered effort. Residual: The residuals from the regressions of the well-being variables on
circumstance and effort variables are considered effort. Age: Age is considered effort (implying
we are equalizing lifetime opportunities). Cor: The correlation between effort and circumstance
variables is not considered a circumstance. Our method for decomposing the equivalent incomes
cannot be used for generating rfair ranks, hence we do not show a figure where individuals are
held responsible for their preferences (see Appendix A.1 for details).
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Figure A.3: Changing the Divergence Measure, D(ry‖rfair)
(a) Magdalou-Nock, s = 0
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1984-2014 using
different divergence measures.
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Figure A.4: Changing the Divergence Measure, D(ry‖runfair)
(a) Magdalou-Nock, s = 0
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(b) Magdalou-Nock, s = 1
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1984-2014 using
different divergence measures.
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